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The role of expertise in dynamic risk assessment: a 
reflection of the problem solving strategies used by 
experienced fireground commanders 
 
 Although the concept of dynamic risk assessment has in recent times become more topical in 
the training manuals of most high risk domains, only a few empirical studies have reported 
how experts actually carry out this crucial task. The knowledge gap between research and 
practice in this area therefore calls for more empirical investigation within the naturalistic 
environment. In this paper, we present and discuss the problem solving strategies employed by 
sixteen experienced operational firefighters using a qualitative knowledge elicitation tool — 
the critical decision method. Findings revealed that dynamic risk assessment is not merely a 
process of weighing the risks of a proposed course of action against its benefits, but rather an 
experiential and pattern recognition process. The paper concludes by discussing the 
implications of designing training curriculum for the less experienced officers using the 
elicited expert knowledge.         
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Introduction 
A building on fire poses a serious threat to human lives, properties, livestock, communities, 
local economies, natural resources and the environment at large (McLennan, Holgate, 
Omodei and Wearing, 2006). The dynamic and extremely dramatic environment where these 
events occur further increases the possibility of exposing firefighters to all sorts of risks and 
task constraints, most of which stem from the need to manage uncertainties, ensure the safety 
of crew members, rescue trapped victims, manage members of the public, adhere to statutory 
obligations binding fire fighters, and verify media perceptions (Burke and Hendry, 1997; 
Ingham, 2007; Grimwood, 2003; Lipshitz et al, 2001; Perry and Wiggins, 2008; Kahneman 
and Klein, 2009; Clancy, 2011). The nature of these environments also explain why 
firefighters sometimes encounter novel and difficult situations, despite being equipped with 
advanced equipment and gadgets such as breathing apparatus, fire resistant clothing and all 
sorts of hose-lines.  
 
For instance, the excerpt below from the work of Flin (1996) illustrates a typical fireground 
scenario and highlights some of the complexities associated with fireground decision making 
mostly under time pressure: 
 
‘On arrival at the scene of a fire, officers are bombarded with a mass of visual and 
other information relating to the incident, its progress and its context. On a short 
time scale, often under great pressure, the officer in charge must grasp the 
situation, understand the problem being faced, prioritize fire service actions on the 
basis of reasonable strategy, deploy available resources, know when to ask for 
reinforcements and what these should be’ (Flin, 1996:140) 
             
To cope with these fast paced events, fireground commanders often employ an important 
cognitive task known as dynamic risk assessment which, as the term suggests, must be 
conducted rapidly. The concept of dynamic risk assessment (DRA) has thus proved of worth 
in promoting thinking about managing dynamic risks in the fire service, and its ability to 
closely link risk taking behaviour to decision making also implies there is now raised 
awareness about the cognitive architecture of incident commanders than ever before 
(Grimwood, 2003; Tissington and Flin, 2005; HM Government, 2008; Ingham, 2008; Klein 
et al, 2010; Clancy, 2011). But despite its growing awareness amongst scholars, the concept 
of dynamic risk assessment has been accused of being quite subjective and therefore difficult 
to measure as a scientific construct (see Tissington and Flin, 2005 for details). For instance, it 
is not yet entirely clear from the procedures binding most high risk domains the exact points 
where officers should follow the basic firefighting rules and where relying on previous 
knowledge would prove more appropriate (Burke, 1997; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Klein, 2003; Lipshitz et al, 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010).  
 
Against the above background, the current paper therefore seeks to examine how expertise 
facilitates and informs the dynamic risk assessment process. By so doing, the dominant 
problem solving strategy employed by the sixteen fire ground incident commanders that 
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participated in the study will be assessed. The motivation for the study was partly hinged on 
the fact that only very few empirical studies have reported how experts actually carry out this 
crucial task of dynamic risk assessment, despite being an important theme in the incident 
command training manual (HM fire inspectorate, 1999; HM Government, 2008). This 
knowledge gap is perceived to have implications for research and practice and therefore 
requires more empirical investigation. It is hence believed that capturing the role of expertise 
in the dynamic risk assessment process is likely to enhance the design of training 
programmes for the less experienced fire officers, particularly at this present time where the 
frequency of occurrence of serious fire incidents has been on a decline.  
 
Expertise and dynamic risk assessment 
As with many other work practices, the firefighting domain is made up of several standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) that guide safe performances at the incident ground (Klein et al, 
2010; Lamb et al, 2014). These SOPs are a combination of the technical procedures (e.g. 
using the right type of equipment such as hosereel, mainjet, ladder, fireman axe etc.) as well 
as the modus operandi of managing incidents (e.g. splitting crews between the front and back 
of a building). For example, one of the rule-based risk philosophies that have been widely 
accepted in the UK fire service states that: 
 ‘Firefighters will take ‘some’ risk to save saveable lives’ 
 ‘Firefighters will take ‘a little’ risk to save saveable property’ 
 ‘Firefighters will ‘not take any risk at all’ to try to save lives or property that are 
already lost’ (HM Fire Service Inspectorate, 1999; HM Government, 2008)  
 
But while it is worth acknowledging that rules and philosophical principles of these sorts are 
useful in most high risk domains as they help establish risk tolerance levels for operators, 
what remains a challenge is finding an appropriate way of evaluating phrases such as ‘some 
risk’, ‘a little risk’ and ‘any risk at all’. A number of studies have suggested that experts often 
make decisions about what is risky/not in dynamic and time-pressured conditions mainly 
through experiential knowledge (Shanteau, 1992; Wong, 2000; Fessey, 2002; Adams, 2003; 
Grimwood, 2003; Perry and Wiggins, 2008; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010; Okoli et al, 
2013). For instance, the fact that a particular procedure is labelled high risk in the fire manual 
does not necessarily always imply that incident commanders must take a defensive (or risk 
averse) position when such situations are encountered in real life; some level of risks must 
still be accepted and managed based on experience. So considering the huge expectations 
members of public usually hold for the response teams, it only becomes logical to expect that 
managing more dangerous and unpredictable fires will require the skills and knowledge of 
the more experienced officers. 
 
According to Shanteau (1992), experts are ‘those who have been recognized within their 
profession as having the necessary skills and abilities to perform at the highest level’. 
Research on expertise has provided ample evidence to show that experts are able to use their 
 
 
existing knowledge to facilitate situation assessment and gain perceptual advantage as events 
unfold (Chase and Simon, 1973; Calderwod et al, 1987; Endsley, 1995; Gobet and Simon, 
1996; Dreyfus, 2004; Feldon, 2007; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010). 
On this note, a number of authors have therefore suggested that experts are not necessarily 
better than novices because they think faster or possess a wider range of skills, but because 
they are able to organize and apply their knowledge and skills better ― through a schema-
based network. It is the operation of schemas that make the process of information retrieval 
from memory much easier and thus allow experts to see more easily what is invisible to 
novices, such as the identification of patterns, relationships and potential consequences of 
action (Sweller, 1994; Gobet, 2005; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010).  
 
But what is dynamic risk assessment? The DRA model (See for example Clancy, 2011; 
Tissington and Flin, 2005; HM Government, 2008) requires that fireground commanders: 
 
 Continuously monitor and evaluate a situation, the tasks, the people and properties at 
risk 
 Select the most appropriate systems of operation 
 Assess and re-assess the chosen systems of operation 
 Introduce additional controls if required 
 Modify and implement action plans as events unfold 
 
The strength of the DRA model is therefore evident from its flexibility, since it provides 
actors with an opportunity to make quick decisions e.g. whether to stick with the ‘gold 
standard’ ways of doing things or make some level of adjustments to existing rules. The 
model is thus unique in that it acknowledges that decision making on the fireground does not 
follow a static or linear model as often postulated by the classical theorists, but is rather 
dependent on various environmental and informational cues in the environment (Okoli et al, 
2014; Ericsson et al, 2007; Harré, Bossomaier, and Synder, 2012).  
 
Problem solving strategies on the fireground: Rule, skill and knowledge based decisions  
 
The notion that experts are able to perform recurrent aspects of tasks using their extensive 
domain knowledge has been well reported in the literature (Sweller, 1994; Dreyfus, 2004; 
Hoffman et al, 1998; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004; Pollock et al, 2002). These authors 
attributed this ability mainly to the efficient functioning of a powerful information processing 
tool known as schema. A schema contains rules and procedures that can systematically link 
particular features of a problem to its possible course of action (IF condition, THEN action). 
Without an adequate knowledge about a particular procedure, skills cannot be transferred for 
solving difficult problems (Feldon, 2007). Hence, one of the features of higher level 
competence is that knowledge becomes increasingly ‘proceduralized’ and readily converted 
into skills. Simply ‘knowing that’ (declarative knowledge) is not enough for most job tasks in 
high reliability organizations such as firefighting, but knowing what to do with what is 
already known, as well as knowing how to combine what is known differently have been 
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shown to be of greater importance in such domains (Wong, 2000). Experts often form their 
action plans and solve new problems using the general knowledge they have about a domain, 
or the knowledge they recall from concrete cases, or both. A direct relationship therefore 
seems to exist between the skills possessed by an expert, their knowledge of the domain and 
the domain rules that guide their actions. Ingham (2007) puts it this way: 
 
‘The application of standard rules does not mean that incident commanders are not 
creative. Working without rules is uninteresting, and absolute liberty is boring. The 
creation of innovative approaches does not happen in a vacuum; rather it is the 
result of playing with the rules, stretching them, moving and testing them. It is 
therefore essential to maintain common operating guidelines, or rules, because 
they form a stock body of common knowledge, but it is also essential to break the 
rules and play around with them because mastery reveals itself as breaking rules. 
The secret of creativity hinges on this insight: to know the right moment when one 
can go too far’ (Ingham 2007: section 24) 
                                                                              
Because it is not very clear how experts transit from one problem solving strategy to another 
and in what particular circumstance they make such transition, this paper also aims to 
examine the boundaries that exist between formal (rule based) and dynamic (adaptive or 
creative) risk assessment methods, and when experts are likely to apply which.  
 
Methodology 
The Critical Decision Method 
This study hinges on the naturalistic decision making (NDM) paradigm which has been 
regarded as both a theoretical and methodological framework (Lipshitz et al, 2001). In the 
NDM community, researchers are mainly interested in capturing the cognitive strategies that 
aid experts’ performance while managing real-life incidents. Studies in this domain are 
therefore specifically designed to examine how experts make decisions in the real world 
using their experience and domain knowledge (Kaempf et al, 1996; Zsambok, 1997; 
Hoffman, Crandall, and Shadbolt, 1998; Wong, 2004; Klein, 2008). As Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) put it:  
‘A central goal of NDM is to demystify intuition by identifying the cues that 
experts use to make their judgments, even if those cues involve tacit knowledge 
and are difficult for the expert to articulate. In this way, NDM researchers try to 
learn from expert professionals’ (Kahneman and Klein, 2009:516) 
 
Since firefighting is one of the domains that heavily rely on explanations from qualified 
experts in an attempt to better understand the cognitive rules and pre-requisite knowledge that 
aid optimum performance, it therefore became important to apply a knowledge elicitation 
tool in this study. Knowledge elicitation tools are structured protocols designed to assist 
experts to explain what they both know and do in their domains of practice. The study 
utilized the critical decision method (CDM) mainly because of its credibility and popularity 
 
 
in the cognitive task analysis literature (for details of the CDM see Klein, Calderwood, and 
MacGregor, 1989; Hoffman et al, 1995; Wong, 2004). The CDM is a retrospective interview 
strategy that applies a set of cognitive probes to actual non-routine tasks (high-risk incidents). 
The CDM probes allow experts to be questioned in-depth as to how they were able to manage 
a particular incident (see ‘procedure’ section below). Through the CDM protocol we were 
able to capture interesting themes that underpin experts’ competence, which includes the 
knowledge and skills used in making complex decisions, the types of information used and 
their sources, the cues sought at each decision point, the rules being followed (both cognitive 
and domain rules), the goals and sub-goals pursued, the amount of time spent on each 
decision, and the type of training that was most helpful in making each decision. 
 
The CDM has been used in a wide range of studies (See Hoffman et al, 1995 for a review) 
and its strength lies in the fact that it is: (i) capable of demystifying the rationale behind 
experts’ decision-making and problem solving strategies (ii) applicable under field conditions 
i.e. naturalistic settings (iii) useful for providing relevant information that can facilitate the 
design of instructional curricula for training novices e.g. less experienced firefighters could 
potentially be trained on how best to assess a situation based on the knowledge elicited from 
experts.  
 
Although the CDM has gained dominance over the past few years as one of the most 
effective knowledge elicitation methods, its major criticism still remains that it cannot 
completely control the effect of memory limitations in human beings. Sceptics believe it is 
quite difficult to narrate a retrospective incident without either missing out some vital 
information or making up additional information. However, a number of empirical studies 
involving interview with experienced fire officers (e.g. Klein et al, 1988; McLennan et al, 
2006; Burke and Hendry, 1997; Okoli et al, 2013) seemed to have challenged these claims. 
Despite some of the limitations that have been linked with retrospective verbal protocols, 
proponents of the critical decision method have demonstrated the effectiveness and reliability 
of the method for eliciting expert knowledge. This study provides additional evidence to 
substantiate existing belief that experienced officers do not easily forget non-routine incidents 
for which their skills and expertise were challenged; this includes incidents dated even as far 
back as 10 years.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
The sample size for this study comprised sixteen experienced fire-fighters (n=16), selected 
across different major fire stations in the UK (n=6) and Nigeria (n=10). The sample was 
selected across the two countries in the wider study for the purpose of comparison, but also to 
identify common themes or similarities that might exist between the two groups with regards 
to fireground decision making. However, the scope of this paper is not to discuss cross-
cultural differences between the UK and Nigerian fire services but to report the breakdown of 
the problem solving strategies that were utilized by both groups of firefighters. We have also 
developed a decision making model elsewhere that attempts to describe how both groups of 
experts make intuitive decisions on the fireground (Okoli et al, 2015) 
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The participants were carefully selected on the basis of their rank/position and also through 
peer nomination; this was to ensure that expertise is verified and not assumed (see Table 1). 
Since this study aims to elicit the knowledge and skills used by experienced fire commanders, 
it became crucial to ensure that only the most qualified experts were recruited. As a result, the 
authors ensured that all the participants that were interviewed had personally been involved 
in managing real-life fire incidents, which meant they had at least operated as incident 
commander (i.e. managing crews and leading one or more fire engines). In addition, all the 
participants recruited for the interview were supervisory managers (i.e. crew commanders, 
watch commanders and station managers), group commanders and flexi-duty officers; all 
ordinary fire-fighter were exempted from participating. One of the most important factors 
that differentiate supervisory managers from ordinary firefighters is the quality of training 
received by the former. The incident command and control training covers more advanced 
subjects in areas like decision making, personnel and resource management, breathing 
apparatus entry procedures, fire investigation, sectorization, team management, situation 
assessment and size up etc.  Hence, it was important to ensure that all participants in this 
study had received incident command training and have managed a good number of complex 
incidents in the course of their firefighting career. The average length of experience for all the 
sixteen participants is 18.5 years (see Table 1). As shown in Figure 1, participants were first 
asked to recall and ‘walk-through’ a memorable fire incident that particularly challenged their 
expertise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. A visual presentation of the steps involved in the critical decision making process 
(Adapted from Klein, Calderwood, and MacGregor, 1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were informed in advance either through an email or a phone call about the 
nature of the interview and were told the type of incidents that were of interest to the study 
i.e. non-routine or atypical incidents. The rationale for limiting the choice of incidents to non-
routine ones is because experts tend to rely more on their tacit knowledge when solving 
difficult tasks than they will normally do when performing routine tasks (Polanyi, 1962; 
Eraut, 2000).  
 
After narrating the incident from start to finish, participants were asked to go over the 
incident again, but this time with the intention of constructing a timeline (i.e. making a 
summary of key decisions made from the start of the incident to when it was brought under 
control). During timeline construction, decision points were also identified: A decision point, 
 
INCIDENT 
Start time                      INCIDENT TIMELINE                   End time 
                           IDENTIFICATION OF DECISION POINTS 
                                 APPLICATION OF COGNITIVE PROBES 
A SUMMARY OF THE CDM PROCEDURE 
Decision Point 2 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
Decision Point 3 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
Decision Point 1 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
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which is the basic unit of analysis in this study, is defined as the point where participants 
admitted choosing a specific course of action where other potential alternatives were 
available. Some examples of decision points include: ‘I committed my crews with breathing 
apparatus into the building’, ‘I withdrew my crews from the building because it was too 
risky’, ‘I requested more appliances because I thought we didn’t have enough at the time’ 
(see Table 2). The timeline construction and decision point identification phases were then 
followed by probing each decision point using a set of cognitive probes. The CDM probes 
which were specifically structured to enhance the knowledge elicitation process contained a 
series of semi-structured interview questions covering some of the themes that were outlined 
earlier (see Hoffman, Crandall, and Shadbolt, 1998 for details of the CDM procedure).  
 
Each interview lasted between 1hr-2.5hr and was tape recorded with the consent of each 
participant. A total of 65 decision points were obtained across the sixteen incidents. The 
interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a combination of a qualitative 
coding process and the emergent themes analytical method developed by Wong (2004). 
 
Results and findings 
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of participants 
Pseudonym Years of 
experience  
Position/rank Nature of 
incident 
Major task constraints 
UK FIREFIGHTERS 
 
 
Adrian 
 
 
17                Watch 
commander 
 
 
 
House fire (Arson) 
 Dealing with a victim who had 
mental health issues 
 Having to turn the incident to a 
welfare issue 
 
 
 
 
Patrick 
 
 
 
 
32 
Asst. Fire chief 
 
 
 
 
 
Petrol storage fire 
 Difficulty in finding the seat of 
fire 
 Pollution of the water courses 
 Fire growing bigger after 4hrs 
of active firefighting 
  
 
 
 
Dickson 
 
 
 
23 Crew 
commander 
 
 
 
Garage workshop 
fire 
 A massive fire resulting from 
acetylene explosion 
 Having to fight the fire from a 
more defensive position 
 
 
 
    Brown 
 
 
 
       27 
Crew 
commander 
 
 
 
 
Garage workshop 
fire 
 The need to simultaneously 
carry out firefighting and 
rescue operations 
 Multi-Agency coordination 
 Treating a victim with 30% 
burns 
 Managing public emotions  
 
 
 
 
 
Lilian 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Director in 
command 
 
 
 
 
 
Bush fire 
 The need to evacuate victims to 
a safe distance 
 Difficulty in providing shelter 
for evacuees 
 Heavy wind negatively 
affecting task performance 
 
 
 
       
    
     Jade 
 
 
 
15 
Crew 
Commander 
 
 
 
Residential house 
fire 
 Access difficulty  
 Limited work space making 
response effort difficult  
 Preventing the fire from 
spreading to other surrounding 
buildings (incident was at the 
heart of the city center) 
NIGERIAN FIREFIGHTERS 
 
 
 
 
Young 
 
 
 
 
8 
Fire Supt officer 
 
 
 
Road traffic 
explosion 
 Loss of human lives 
 Managing the emotional 
outbursts of public members  
 Multi-Agency coordination 
 The need to carry out rescue 
and firefighting tasks  
simultaneously  
Kevin 8 
Watch 
commander 
Residential house 
fire 
 Heavy wind negatively 
affecting task performance 
 Preventing the fire from 
spreading to other surrounding 
buildings 
Sammy 8 
Fire supt. officer 
Warehouse fire  Difficulty in gaining access to 
the seat of fire 
 Thick and poisonous emissions 
from the smoke thereby 
making response effort difficult  
 Coping with public intrusion  
Knight 8 
Watch 
commander 
School building fire  Managing public emotions 
 The need to prevent the fire 
from spreading further 
Adams 30 Chief fire supt. School building fire  Pressure to contain the fire and 
prevent further damage  
 Ensuring safety of crew 
members amidst uncertainty    
Ryan 8 Fire supt. officer Residential house 
fire 
 Access difficulty to the seat of 
fire 
 Risk of electrocution resulting 
from direct firefighting on an 
electrical appliance 
Marvin 30 Station Manager Train explosion  Novelty of the incident; never 
managed train fire before 
 The need to carry out rescue 
and firefighting tasks  
simultaneously 
 Carrying out rescue activities 
on a moving train 
Atkinson 8 Watch 
commander 
Petrol storage fire  Massive fire due to petrol 
explosion 
 Pressure to avoid further 
explosion with combustible 
materials all around the vicinity  
 Managing public emotions 
 Managing media scrutiny 
 
Jack 
30 Chief fire supt.     
Furniture factory 
fire 
 
 Heavy wind negatively 
affecting task performance 
 Sourcing and managing water 
supply 
 Risk of electrical explosion in 
the area due to the effect of the 
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For the purpose of this study, the phrase ‘problem solving strategy’ refers to the behavior 
which fire ground commanders display while responding to complex fire ground tasks. In one 
of his early studies, Rasmussen (1983) developed a construct that outlined three types of such 
behaviours: rule based behaviour, skill based behaviour and knowledge based behaviour. 
Drawing on Rasmussen’s idea, each decision point in this study was classified as any of 
standard, typical or creative as discussed below: 
 
 
 
Standard decisions 
These are decisions for which every officer would normally know what to do i.e. the standard 
way of doing things in the fire service. The decisions that fell within this category include 
points where experts were basically following fire-fighting rules, standard operating 
procedures or fire manuals. The fire-fighting profession, being a high risk job by its very 
nature, entails that officers follow some domain rules and procedures e.g. rules of 
communication between the operational team and the control room, rules for committing 
firemen into a building with breathing apparatus, rules for evacuating victims within certain 
distance away from the scene of incidents (see Table 2). Some of the participants emphasized 
the importance of following domain rules where possible, claiming those rules are actually 
there to ensure tasks are effectively carried out within the brackets of safety. 
 
Participants were carefully probed regarding the standard rules they were following at each 
decision point, if any. Each decision point was carefully matched against both the incident 
timeline and cognitive probes, and then coded as ‘standard’ if any of the decisions was 
reported by experts as ‘the normal way of doing things’. Care was taken to differentiate 
between decision points where experts were strictly adhering to standard rules (standard 
rules) and where they were making adaptations to the rules (typical rules). For example, 
recognizing the need to request additional resources on the fireground was coded under the 
standard (or rule based) category, but knowing the actual time to request the resources and/or 
providing an estimate of the amount of resources required was coded as typical since some 
modifications has now been made to the SOPs (see table 2 for examples). Hence, as shown in 
Fig 2 below, 24.6% of all decision points fell into the rule based category.  
 
Table 2 Analysis of rule based, adaptive and creative decisions from selected decision points 
wind on the power source   
 
Sunny 29 Asst. Chief fire 
supt. 
Office fire  Difficulty in gaining access to 
the seat of fire  
 Presence of combustible 
materials in the building 
 Pressure to save valuable assets 
and important documents in the 
office  
 
 
Actions (Decision points)  Is this a Standard 
operational 
procedure in the 
fire service? (Y/N) 
How participants approached each decision 
point 
Standard  
 
(Knowing 
that) 
Typical   
 
(Knowing 
when & 
Knowing  how) 
Creative 
 
(combining bits 
and pieces of 
information to 
form a story) 
Assessing the situation upon arrival at the 
scene of incident  
 
Y 
 
  
    X 
 
       X 
 
Ensuring that BA sets are well monitored 
upon committing crews into a building 
 
Y 
 
 
    X 
  
Ensuring communication between operational 
team and control room i.e. every 10mins at 
the start of an incident, and then every 20 
mins as the incident dies down 
 
 
Y 
 
  
 
       X 
 
Evacuating the fire crews within a radius of 
200m in the involvement of acetylene or LPG 
cylinders 
 
Y 
 
 
    X 
 
   
 
           X 
Requesting extra resources  
Y 
 
    X 
 
       X 
 
 
Using the appropriate firefighting medium 
e.g. Hosereel or Mainjet 
 
Y 
 
 
    X 
 
       X 
 
Requesting assistance from other emergency 
response organizations such as Police, 
Ambulance, Road safety, civil defence 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
    
 
       X 
 
Getting to the scene of an incident through the 
nearest route and as soon as possible 
 
Y 
 
   
    X 
  
Ensuring firefighters are committed in pairs 
into a well-alight building 
 
 
                  Y 
 
     
     X 
  
Climbing the ladder to the roof of the 
building, or breaking difficult walls to be able 
to gain access to the seat of fire 
 
N 
  
 
        X 
 
 
          X 
Notifying control room when switching from 
defensive to offensive strategy 
 
Y 
 
   
 
         X 
 
Taking over from a less ranked commander at 
the scene of an incident   
 
Y 
  
         X 
 
Sourcing for water in an area with low 
pressure or no hydrants  
                   
                  Y 
   
           X 
 Note: It should be noted that the categorization process was solely context-based, which explains 
why some decision points had the three problem solving strategies represented.  
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The participants however reported that they are often forced to either neglect or adapt 
firefighting rules to suit current circumstances, especially if such rules have been judged less 
profitable, through dynamic risk assessment. This problem solving style is discussed next: 
Adaptive (typical) decisions 
These are decisions that required modifications or refinements to the standard way of doing 
things in solving a particular task. The CDM reports showed that one of the hallmarks of 
expertise is recognizing when and where following standard rules are likely to be flawed and 
adjusting response plans accordingly. Decisions that fell into this category include those for 
which experts showed a high level of flexibility and adaptivity in solving a particular 
problem.  
 
Analysis of the decision points showed that 63.1% of the overall decisions fell within this 
problem solving category, suggesting that the majority of decisions made by expert officers 
were skill-based and adaptive (see Fig 2). For example, one of the participants Patrick (32, 
Assistant Fire Chief, UK)
1
 reported how he over-ruled the decision of a less experienced 
officer who was at the verge of requesting 12 additional pumps, asking him to increase the 
number of pumps 15 instead. Patrick reported making this intuitive decision after seeing the 
magnitude of the fire and its huge potential for spread. Another experienced participant, 
Adam (Chief Fire Superintendent, 30, Nigeria), also reported how he instructed his crew to 
utilize a hosereel (a type of hose that produces small quantity of water but with very high 
pressure) instead of a mainjet (a very big hose that produces large quantity of water but with 
less pressure). Adam explained that although using a mainjet would have probably been the 
most appropriate firefighting medium judging by the size of the fire, it could have in turn 
increased the possibility of the building to collapse, especially as cracks had already been 
spotted on walls. Therefore unlike the standard decision making strategy, adaptive decisions 
extend beyond merely “knowing that” to also include, more importantly, “knowing how” 
and/or “knowing when” (see decision points in Table 2).   
 
                                                          
1
 Note that participants’ rank and years of experience are displayed in parenthesis next to their names 
(pseudonyms) for ease of reference.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of the problem solving strategies used by participants 
Creative decisions 
These are decisions which typically require creative problem solving strategies. In this 
problem solving category, no direct rules exist regarding how things should be done and 
pattern recognition is usually impossible because of the high level of novelty associated with 
the incident (see Cohen et al, 1998; Klein et al, 2010). In these circumstances, experts are 
obliged to make things work through improvisation, story building (combining bits of 
elements together to create a satisficing tactic) and creative insights.  
 
As part of the cognitive probes, as with the other problem solving strategies, participants 
were asked to clarify at each decision point whether they were following any rules or whether 
they were being creative. They were also asked to explain why they think they were being 
creative i.e. if they admitted to being creative. Hence, a decision point is coded as creative if 
participants were able to demonstrate that they were making use of their ‘out of the box’ 
knowledge.  As shown in Figure 2, 12.3% of all decisions made by the experts were found 
to be creative 
 
Although the perception and interpretation of what makes up a creative decision differed 
across the incidents and also amongst experts, three parameters were generally used by the 
experts to define what a creative decision is: 
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 (i) Decisions that entailed making significant changes to an action plan i.e. moving from 
doing what is typical to expressing acts of “heroism”.  Heroic acts in this context means 
going the extra mile in finding alternative ways of doing things — even if it meant going 
beyond the boundaries of one’s comfort zone in order to save lives and properties. Below are 
examples of creative decisions as reported by the participants: 
 
 Manually breaking of walls, doors and glasses so as to gain access to the seat of fire 
(Sammy, Fire Superintendent Officer, 8, Nigeria; Sunny, Assistant Chief Fire 
Superintendent, 29, Nigeria) 
 Completely removing the roof of a building in order to gain access to the seat of fire 
(Patrick, Assistant Fire Chief, 32, Nigeria) 
 
The above two incidents were instances where the officers in charge could have easily 
admitted to defeat and withdraw their crews. But instead they chose to increase their risk 
appetite by going more offensive, which eventually proved more rewarding.     
(ii) Decisions that were almost completely opposite some of the stipulations in the standard 
operational procedures of the fire service (albeit for a just cause). 
 decision not to withdraw the fire crews to a distance of 200m in an incident involving 
LPG and acetylene cylinders against what was stipulated in firefighting manuals 
(Dickson, crew commander, 27, UK) 
(iii) Decisions that required creating new ideas through improvisation, especially in novel 
circumstances  
 Creatively fastening a mainjet water supply to a wall in order to keep attacking the 
fire while fire crews are safely withdrawn from the immediate environment (Brown, 
23, Crew commander, UK) 
 Digging a temporary dam for storing water and also liaising with water carriers to 
ensure a steady supply of water in a rural area with extremely low pressured hydrants 
(Darren, station manager, 17, UK)  
 
 
The role of experience in dynamic risk assessment: Evidence from experts’ qualitative 
report 
 
One of the most important objectives of the study was to identify where and how the 
knowledge for making fireground decisions was obtained. The excerpts in table 3 
demonstrate how participants reported this experience-based prototypical decision making 
strategy:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Excerpts showing participants’ responses to the sources of information on the fireground 
  
 
 
Participants’ answers to the question: where and how was 
the information for making fireground decisions obtained 
from? 
Key phrase 
The only way I can describe it is that those incidents contribute to a template, 
and those templates are in your head; just a framework for thinking that you 
call upon instinctively. You may only have 5 or 6 templates perhaps, but 
most of the incidents you go to will fit into one of those templates (Patrick, 
Assistant Fire Chief, 32, UK) 
 
 
Insights gained from previous 
incidents 
It was an unusual incident, but something inside you takes over, where you 
go into a mode of professionalism. And it comes because you’ve been doing 
it for that long, and through the training and the knowledge and experience 
you are able to go into a firefighter mode (Brown, Crew Commander, 27, 
UK) 
 
 
 
Experiential knowledge 
I didn’t look at that incident and think this is like any other incident that I 
went to. I take learning points from all the incidents I go to and that, I 
believe, produces an ability to then make decisions (Jade, Crew Commander, 
15, UK) 
 
 
Lessons learnt from past 
incidents 
There are some [incidents] that are similar, and some that are not similar, but 
you must remember. Like today, if we attended the same scene and we 
noticed the same building, about 5-7 rooms, and two rooms were not 
affected, we can apply the same method we used there (Adams, 30, CFS, 
Nigeria) 
 
 
 
Lessons learnt from past 
incidents 
Yes, [you are reminded of previous incidents] but I think it is more of a 
collection of experiences as opposed to a particular incident (Sunny, 29. 
ACFS, Nigeria) 
     
Experiential knowledge  
…..but with 8 years’ experience that I have, following tankers, fighting fires 
everywhere, entering well, entering rivers to rescue, fighting fire, gas fire, 
petrol fire, free burning fire, oil fire. I have attended all. So with those 
experiences not once, not twice, not thrice (Kevin, Watch commander, 8, 
Nigeria) 
 
 
Experiential knowledge  
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As shown in Table 3 all the expert participants agreed that dealing with a current problem 
often requires making use of previous knowledge and experiences, mainly by matching cues 
from the environment to the numerous patterns that have been pre-stored in the memory. 
Prior research has evidenced how experienced commanders develop domain knowledge from 
the consistent and repeated experiences they have linked together unconsciously to form a 
pattern (Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993; Fessey, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Klein, 2003; 
Perry and Wiggins, 2008). A pattern therefore represents a set of “action scripts” that is 
chunked together and often triggered by one or more internal or external cues. The authors 
have published this cue-action relationship on the fireground elsewhere (see Okoli et al, 
2014)  
Discussion and conclusion  
 
Findings from figure 2 showed that experts utilized the three problem solving strategies (i.e. 
standard, adaptive and creative decisions) when solving complex firefighting tasks, of course 
depending on the nature of the incident. Further analysis of the various decision points also 
generated insights regarding the sequence of this arrangement i.e. the conversion that exists 
between the application of rule, skill and knowledge based decisions. For example, Table 2 
showed that rules and procedures seemed to be invoked when performing recurrent or routine 
aspects of tasks (e.g. requesting additional resources), since expected outcomes are mostly 
similar from problem to problem. But in situations where expected outcomes varied from 
problem to problem (non-routine tasks such as carrying out firefighting and rescue tasks on a 
moving train), the experts tended to depend less on rules/procedures and rely more on their 
prototypical and creative ability. These findings therefore give credence to existing beliefs 
that experts seem to understand the boundaries of their skills and when to apply or switch 
between the three strategies as events unfold (Rasmussen, 1983; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 
2002; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
 
Specifically, the early research of Polanyi, who has been regarded as the father of tacit 
knowledge provides further explanation to the relationship that exists between rule based, 
adaptive and creative decisions (Polanyi, 1962). Polanyi’s main line of thought was that 
creative acts (or acts of discovery) are imbued with strong personal feelings and 
commitments, and that knowledge is highly dependent on human action — what we termed 
experiential knowledge in this study. In one of his famous books titled Personal Knowledge, 
Polanyi (1958, pp.3) refuted the then dominant belief that science was value-free, arguing 
instead that the informed guesses, gut-feelings and intuitions which are part of exploratory 
acts are motivated by what he called ‘passions’. The assumption that codified or theoretical 
knowledge (in our case rule-based knowledge) is totally objective was therefore the major 
bone of contention for Polanyi. Taking a closer look at how the so called codified knowledge 
is used in practice, he argued that such knowledge is grounded on ‘personal judgments’ and 
‘tacit commitments’. Since the majority of the decisions experts made were adaptive (63.1%), 
meaning that the standard ways of doing things were in most cases refined and adjusted to 
 
 
suit current goals, it therefore becomes logical to infer that dynamic risk assessment requires 
making adjustments to domain rules, and in some cases making creative decisions through 
experience. 
 
Furthermore, the qualitative reports in Table 3 provided additional evidence regarding the 
relationship between dynamic risk assessment and experiential knowledge. We strongly 
believe that adaptive decisions reflect both the level of experience and the quality of training 
that officers have been exposed to over the course of their firefighting career. This therefore 
explains, to a large extent, why the experienced fire commanders were able to look at a 
burning building, envision the stairways, elevator shafts and roof supports and then 
intuitively predict what was happening inside, making sense of their implications for task 
performance. Experience was also found to be vital in making critical fire ground decisions 
such as whether to employ an offensive attack or to go defensive, whether to commit crews 
into a building or become more precautionary, whether to allocate more resources at the 
beginning of an incident or wait till a later stage when more information must have been 
obtained.  
 
Since commanders are aware that generating and/or evaluating a large set of options will 
likely cause the fire to span out of control and then become impossible to manage, some 
authors have shown that they rely instead on their experience to generate a workable option, 
which is usually the first, and possibly the only option they would have to consider (Burke, 
1997; Johnson and Raab, 2003). Thankfully, a number of scholars have attempted to 
demystify, through the concept of pattern recognition, how experts are able to utilize previous 
knowledge in solving current tasks (Gobet, 2005; McLennan et al, 2006; Lipshitz et al, 2007; 
Perry and Wiggins, 2008; Klein, 2008; Harré, Bossomaier, and Snyder, 2012; Klein, 2008). 
This concept has thus been widely utilized in the field of cognitive psychology to explain 
how professionals are able to carry out a quick scan across the large repertoire of patterns in 
their memory, from which they are then able to select the most appropriate ‘action scripts’ 
that best suit a current situation. The expert reports presented in the various sections above 
and also in Table 3 thus provided a useful explanation as to how and why domain experts — 
even under intense time-pressure, shifting goals and incomplete information — are still able 
to conduct dynamic risk assessments rapidly and yet accurately. Experienced firefighters 
often strive to draw from their rich mental model through which they can then describe, 
explain and predict events better. 
 
The above findings support two of the most prominent theories in the expertise literature: the 
chunking theory (Chase and Simon, 1973) and the template theory (Gobet and Simon, 1996). 
Just as proposed in these theories we found that the amount of templates chunked into an 
expert’s memory is a function of the amount of incidents they have attended in the past, their 
years of experience and their level of exposure to difficult tasks — through which they are 
then able to build up a reservoir of recognized pattern (see Table 1). Previous studies have 
shown that the more patterns people are able to acquire over their years of practice, the more 
they are able to match a new situation to one of the patterns stored in their reservoir of 
knowledge (Shanteau, 1992; Zsambok, 1997; Eraut, 2000; Fessey, 2002; Rosen, Shuffler, and 
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Salas, 2010). This explains why fire fighters, in real life, could see the colour of a smoke and 
intuitively know that toxic chemicals and other combustible materials are involved.  
 
Despite evidence from the current study to substantiate existing claims underpinning 
experts’ competence in managing complex incidents, prior research has shown that 
experts’ judgments are not always accurate. For example, Kahneman and Klein (2009) 
revealed certain conditions in which experts might also be as vulnerable to the same 
mistakes as novices, implying therefore that trusting experts’ judgement solely on the 
basis of their years of experience or subjective confidence could be misleading. The 
extensive knowledge and skill sets possessed by experts can also serve as a potential 
source of overconfidence if not harnessed with prudence. When experts attain certain 
level of competence they tend to rely more on automated (tacit) knowledge, which 
sometimes result in ignoring certain cues they feel unfamiliar with. Hence the danger of 
expertise in this regard lies in missing out, explaining away or ignoring some important 
cues (Okoli et al, 2015). Klein (2003) used the term fixation to explain how actors 
sometimes choose a particular course of action and tenaciously cling to it without the 
willingness to compromise. We therefore acknowledge that expertise can somewhat 
affect the quality of generated knowledge outputs in studies involving knowledge 
elicitation. For instance, when interviewees fail to acknowledge the link between 
automaticity and expertise, they often tend to unintentionally fabricate consciously 
reasoned explanations for their unconscious actions during knowledge elicitation 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Wiley, 1998).  
Although the critical decision method utilized in this study has proved of worth in 
overcoming most of the effects of expertise during knowledge elicitation, we hope that 
mentioning these potential downsides of expertise will create awareness amongst 
scholars who have interest in recruiting experts for research purposes.   
Finally, since the ability to effectively conduct dynamic risk assessments on the fireground 
lies in utilizing existing knowledge, which is largely rooted in experience and deliberate 
practice, we therefore recommend that standard operational procedures should be treated as a 
tool for informing rather than one for dictating. The less experienced officers should be made 
to explore various scenarios e.g. training facilitators could design learning tasks for which 
novices are only required to apply basic firefighting rules and those where applying such 
rules could appear counter-productive. It is believed that a training procedure that is heavily 
focused on making rule-based decisions could apparently jeopardize the creative power of 
professionals, thereby slowing down their learning curve.  
 
Future research is needed in this area to investigate the mode of conversion between the rule 
based, adaptive and creative decision styles across a wider domain of practice. In addition, 
future research involving expert studies or knowledge elicitation may benefit from a more 
robust knowledge output by utilizing two or more knowledge elicitation tools that will not 
only aid the expert knowledge elicitation process but also help to compare various aspects of 
expert knowledge.       
 
 
 
References 
 Burke, E. (1997) Competence in command: recent R&D in the London Fire Brigade. Journal 
of Managerial Psychology 12(4): 261-279. 
Burke, E. and Hendry, C. (1997) Decision making on the London incident ground: an 
exploratory study. Journal of Managerial Psychology 12(1): 40-47. 
Chase, W.G. and Simon, H.A. (1973) Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology 4 (1): 55-81  
Clancy, D (2011) Can acceptable risk be defined in Wildland Firefighting? Proceedings of 
the Second Conference on the Human Dimensions of Wildland Fire, Newtown Square, 
PA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Research Station 
Cohen, M.S., Freeman, J.T. and Wolf, S (1996) Meta-Recognition in Time-Stressed Decision 
Making: Recognizing, Critiquing, and Correcting. Human Factors 38 (2): 206-219 
Dane, E., and Pratt, M.E. (2009) Conceptualizing and measuring intuition: a review of recent 
trends. International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 24: 1-40. 
Dreyfus, S.E. (2004) The five-stage model of adult skill acquisition. Bulletin of science, 
technology & society 24 (3): 177-181 
Endsley, M.R. (1995) Towards a theory of situational awareness. Human Factors 37(1): 32-
64 
Eraut, M. (2000) Non-formal learning and tacit knowledge in professional work. British 
Journal of Educational Psychology 70 (1): 113-136 
Ericsson, K.A., Prietula, M.J. and Cokely, E.T. (2007) The making of an expert. Harvard 
Business Review 85:114–121 
Feldon, D.F. (2007) The Implications of Research on Expertise for Curriculum and 
Pedagogy. Journal of Education Psychology Review 19 (2): 91-110 
Fessey, C.A. (2002) Capturing expertise in the development of practice: Methodology and 
approaches. Learning in Health and Social Care, 1(1): 47-58. 
Flin, R. (1996) Sitting in the hot seat: Leaders and teams for Critical Incident Management. 
New York: John Wiley 
Gobet, F. and Simon, H.A. (1996) Recall of random and distorted chess positions: 
Implications for the theory of expertise. Memory & cognition 24 (4): 493-503. 
Gobet, F. (2005) Chunking models of expertise: Implications for education. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 19(2): 183-204 
Goldstein, D. G. and Gigerenzer, G. (2002) Models of ecological rationality: The recognition 
heuristic. Psychological Review 109 (1): 75–90. 
                                                                                                                                   
 
21 
 
Grimwood, P. (2003) Tactical Firefighting: A Comprehensive Guide to Compartment 
Firefighting & Live Fire Training. Fire tactics: 40-80. Available at 
http://www.firetactics.com/FLASHOVER%20%20FIREFIGHTERS%20NIGHTMARE
.pdf  
Harré, M., Bossomaier, T. and Synder, A. (2012) The Perceptual Cues that Reshape Expert 
Reasoning. Nature Scientific Reports 2 (502): 1-9. 
Hilbig, B.E., Scholl, S.G. and Pohl, R.F. (2010) Think or blink- is the recognition heuristic an 
“intuitive” strategy? Judgment and Decision Making 5 (4): 300-309.  
HM Fire Service Inspectorate (1999) Fire Service Manual Volume 2. Fire Service 
Operations. HM Fire Service Inspectorate Publications. London: HMSO.  
HM Government (2008) Fire and Rescue Manual, fire service operations, Incident command. 
Volume 2. London: TSO 
Hoffman, R.R., Crandall, B. and Shadbolt, N.R. (1998) Use of the Critical Decision Method 
to elicit expert knowledge: A case study in the Methodology of Cognitive Task 
Analysis. Journal of Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 40 (2): 254-276  
Hoffman, R.R., Shadbolt, N.R., Burton, A.M. and Klein, G.A. (1995) Eliciting expert 
knowledge: A methodological analysis. Organizational behavior and Human Decision 
Making 62 (2): 129-158 
Hogarth, R.M. (2003) Educating Intuition: A challenge for the 21
st
 century. Barcelona: 
Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional  
Ingham, V. (2007) Decisions on Fire. Journal of Media and Culture, 10 (3). Available online 
at http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/06-ingham.php  
Ingham, V. (2008) Crisis communication and multimodal decision making on the fireground. 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 23 (3): 9-13 
Johnson, J. G. and Raab, M. (2003) Take the ﬁrst: Option generation and resulting choices. 
Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 91(2): 215–229. 
Kahneman, D. and Klein, G. (2009) Conditions for Intuitive Expertise. A failure to Disagree. 
Journal of the American Psychological Association 64(6): 515-526 
Klein, G., Calderwood, A.R. and MacGregor, D. (1989) Critical decision method for eliciting 
knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 19 (3): 462-472. 
Klein, G. (2003) The power of Intuition: How to use your gut feelings to make better 
decisions at Work. New York: Doubleday 
Klein, G. (2008) Naturalistic decision making. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society 50(3): 456-460. 
 
 
Klein, G., Calderwood, R. and Clinton-Cirocco, A. (2010) Rapid decision making on the fire 
ground: The original study plus a postscript. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and 
Decision Making 4(3): 186-209. 
Lamb, K.J., Davies, J., Bowley, R. and Williams, J. (2014) Incident command training: the 
introspect model, International Journal of Emergency Services 3 (2): 131 - 143 
Lipshitz, R., Klein, G., Orasanu, J and Salas, E. (2001) Focus article: Taking stock of 
Naturalistic Decision Making. Journal of Behavioural Decision Making 14 (5): 331-352 
Lipshitz, R., Omodei, M., MacLennan, J. and Wearing, A. (2007) What’s burning? The 
RAWFS heuristic on the fire ground. In: Expertise out of context: Proceedings of the 
Sixth international conference on naturalistic decision making, pp. 97-111. 
Marewski, J.N., Gaissmaier, W. and Gigerenzer, G. (2010) Good judgments do not require 
complex cognition. Cognitive process 11 (2): 103-121. 
McLennan, J., Holgate, A.M., Omodei, M.M. and Wearing, A.J. (2006) Decision making 
effectiveness in wildfire incident management teams. Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management 14(1): 27-37. 
Okoli, J.O., Weller, G., Watt, J. and Wong, B.L.W. (2013) Decision making strategies used 
by experts and the potential for training intuitive skills: A preliminary study. 
Proceedings of the 11
th
 International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, 
France: Arpege Science Publishing, pp. 227-232 
Okoli, J.O., Weller, G. and Watt, J. (2014) Eliciting experts' knowledge in emergency 
response organizations. International Journal of Emergency Service, 3 (2): 118-130. 
Okoli, J.O., Weller, G. and Watt, J. (2015) Information processing and intuitive decision 
making on the fireground: Towards a model of expert intuition. Cognition, Technology 
and Work  
 
Paas, F., Renkl, A. and Sweller, J. (2004) Cognitive load theory: Instructional implications of 
the interaction between information structures and cognitive architecture. Instructional 
science, 32 (1): 1-8. 
Perry, N. C. and Wiggins. M.W. (2008) Cue generation amongst firefighters: Competent vs. 
expert differences. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting 52 (4): 418-422.  
Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
Polanyi, M. (1962) Tacit knowing: its bearing on some problems of Philosophy. Reviews of 
Modern Physics, 34 (4): 601-615. 
                                                                                                                                   
 
23 
 
Pollock, E., Chandler, P. and Sweller, J. (2002) Assimilating complex information. Learning 
and instruction, 12 (1): 61-86. 
Rasmussen, J. (1983) Skills, rules and knowledge: signals, signs and symbols, and other 
distinctions in human performance models. IEEE Transactions on systems, Man and 
Cybernetics 13(3): 257-267 
Rosen, M. A., Shuffler, M. and Salas, E. (2010) How experts make decisions: Beyond the 
JDM paradigm. Industrial and Organizational Psychology 3(4): 438-442. 
Scott, J. (2000) Rational choice theory. In: G. Browning., A. Halcli and F. Webster (eds.) 
understanding contemporary society: Theories of the present. London: Sage, pp. 126–
138. 
Shanteau, J. (1992) Competence in experts: the role of task characteristics. Organisational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 53 (2): 252-266. 
Sweller, J. (1994) Cognitive load theory, learning difficulty, and instructional 
design. Learning and instruction 4 (4): 295-312. 
Tissington, P.A. and Flin, R. (2005) Assessing risk in dynamic situations: Lessons from fire 
service operations. Risk Management 7(4): 42-51 
Weick, K.E. (1993) The Collapse of Sense making in Organizations: The Mann Gulch 
Disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly 38(4): 628–652. 
Wong, B.L.W (2000) The Integrated Decision Model in Emergency Dispatch Management 
and its implications for Design. Australian Journal of Information Systems 2(7): 95-107. 
Wong, B. L. W. (2004) Data analysis for the Critical Decision Method. In: D. Diaper and N. 
Stanton (eds.) Task Analysis for Human-Computer Interaction. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, pp. 327-346. 
Zsambok, C. E. (1997) Naturalistic decision making: Where are we now? In: C. E. Zsambok 
and G. A. Klein. (eds.) Naturalistic decision making. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 3-16.
 
 
 
